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RECONCILIATION OF STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Plaintiff provided a statement of 16 numbered facts in 
the Brief of Appellant. Rather than responding, Defendant 
presented its own statement of 10 facts. Following its 
Statement of Facts, Defendant also attempted to summarize a 
limited amount of testimony presented in the case. For the 
convenience of the Court, Plaintiff seeks to reconcile the 
parties' Statement of Facts, below. 
A, Plantiff#s Statement of Facts. 
1. Defendant does not dispute the creation of the 
survey on September 26, 2 000. 
2. Defendant does not dispute the fact that the 
survey certificate was recorded in November, 2000. 
3. Defendant does not dispute that the sole purpose 
of the recorded survey was to define a height restriction on 
any building constructed on Lot. No. 29 when it was 
ultimately sold by Mr. Panos. [See in particular R. 587-589] 
4. Defendant does not dispute that the recorded 
survey establishes a base measurement point for the height 
restriction. 
5. Defendant does not dispute that Elm Ridge Road, 
the street lying to the West of Lot. No. 29, is sloped, 
thereby requiring a base measurement point in order to 
define any height restriction. 
6. In referencing the Affidavit of Ron Thrapp, the 
Defendant acknowledges that Mr. Thrapp acted a real estate 
agent for Mr. Panos and that Mr. Thrapp testified concerning 
his numerous conversations with Mr. Olsen concerning the 
height restriction, from which Mr. Thrapp was certain that 
Mr. Olsen understood that the height restriction was to be 
measured from the base measurement point as provided by the 
recorded survey. While Defendant's Fact No. 9 alleges that 
Mr. Panos never met or spoke with Mr. Olsen prior to the 
closing of the sale, Defendant neglects to dispute the fact 
that after the sale Mr. Panos had conversations directly 
with Jay Olsen about the height restriction, in which Jay 
Olsen acknowledged his understanding that the height 
restriction was to be measured from the base measurement 
point as provided by the recorded survey. [R: 422, 431-432, 
437, 440, 443, 564, 587-604] 
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7. Defendant's Fact No. 1 references the Real Estate 
Purchase Contract (XXREPC") exchanged among the parties on 
July 6, 2 001. Defendant's Fact No. 1 indicates that Jay 
Olsen, the principal of the Defendant, was the drafter of 
the REPC. Defendant's Fact Nos. 2 and 3 acknowledge that the 
parties agreed upon the terms of the REPC on July 6, 2001. 
Defendant does not dispute that in faxing the REPC to Jay 
Olsen, Mr. Panos, through his agent Ron Thrapp, attached a 
copy of the recorded survey and confirmed with Jay Olsen 
that the survey was being provided to define the measurement 
of the height restriction which was referenced in the 
addendum to the REPC. 
8. Again, in summarizing the Affidavit of Ron Thrapp, 
Defendant acknowledges that Mr. Thrapp testified that he had 
numerous conversations with Mr. Olsen in which Mr. Olsen 
expressed that he understood that the survey defined the 
precise measurement of the height restriction. 
9. Again, in summarizing the Affidavit of Ron Thrapp, 
Defendant acknowledged that Mr. Thrapp testified that he 
attended the closing of the sale with Mr. Panos, that the 
title company presented the survey to Mr. Panos at closing 
as an explanation for the measurement of the height 
restriction contained in the Warranty Deed, and that Mr. 
Thrapp was aware based on his communication with Mr. Olsen 
that Mr. Olsen had the same understanding. In Defendant's 
Fact No. 10, Defendant also acknowledges that at one point 
after construction commenced, the trusses of the roof were 
lowered. Mr. Olsen7s initial adjustment to the height of the 
roof was based on the conversations initiated by Mr. Panos 
after closing in which they discussed the height restriction 
on the survey. [R. 422, 431-432, 437, 440, 443.] 
10. Defendant's Fact No. 5 identifies the Warranty 
Deed from Mr. Panos to Olsen & Associates Construction, Inc. 
Defendant's Fact No. 6 acknowledges the express language of 
the Warranty Deed creating the 32-foot height restriction on 
any construction on the property. Again, Defendant's summary 
of various statements from the Affidavit of Ron Thrapp also 
confirms that it was the testimony of Mr. Thrapp that Mr. 
Olsen understood that the survey defined the measurement of 
the height restriction contained in the Warranty Deed. 
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11. Defendant does not dispute that the Warranty Deed 
was drafted by the title company or that the recorded survey 
is the sole document that the parties used to define the 
measurement of the height restriction contained in the 
Warranty Deed. Moreover, Defendant's Fact No. 9 confirms 
that Mr. Panos relied upon Mr. Thrapp and the title company 
to implement the intended height restriction in the closing 
documents. 
12. Defendant does not dispute that the original 
surveyor updated the survey after a residence was 
constructed on Lot No. 29. 
13. Defendant does not dispute that the updated survey 
concludes that the peak of the roof violates the height 
restriction by 2.91 feet. Defendant does reference the 
Affidavit of David Jenkins, Mr. Olsen's engineer, who 
concluded that the roof was 31.96 feet above a measurement 
point on the curb adjacent to the street.1 Defendant's brief 
attempts to interpret the Affidavit of David Jenkins to 
1
 The survey provided by Ensign Engineering and prepared by David Jenkins states, "Set Rivet in Curb Benchmark 
= 100.00." A rivet in the curb closer to the point used in Plaintiffs survey shows an elevation of 96.95, while a 
nearby rivet in the street shows an elevation of 96.36. Thus, the curb is apparently higher than the street. 
assert that the measurement point on the curb used by Mr. 
Jenkins is somehow close enough to the elevation of the 
street. Neither the survey nor the Affidavit actually 
provides a basis for such a conclusion. 
14. Defendant does not dispute that objects protrude 
an additional 2 0 inches above the peak of the roof, making 
the violation of the height restriction a total of 4.58 feet 
as measured in accordance with the recorded survey or 1.6 
feet based on the testimony of Defendant's own expert. 
15. Defendant does not dispute that the objects 
protruding another 2 0 inches above the peak of the roof 
violate the height restriction, even if the measurement is 
taken from the point on the curb referenced by Mr. Jenkins 
in his affidavit. See also Fact No. 13, above. 
16. Defendant does not dispute that the residence 
constructed by the Defendant, including the objects 
protruding from the roof, constitute a material obstruction 
of the view enjoyed by Mr. Panos from his residence. 
B. Defendants Statement of Relevant Facts. 
1. Undisputed. 
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2. Undisputed. 
3. Undisputed. 
4. Undisputed. See also response to Fact No. 7, 
below. 
5. Undisputed. 
6. Undisputed. 
7. Undisputed. However, the recorded survey was 
provided together with the REPC to Mr. Olsen concurrently 
with the parties entering into the REPC. Mr. Thrapp and Mr. 
Olsen discussed the survey as the standard by which the 
height restriction was to be measured. Therefore, the 
recorded survey evidences a meeting of the minds by the 
parties concerning the measurement of the height 
restriction. In addition, the survey was recorded in the 
office of the Salt Lake County Surveyor in November, 2 000 as 
Survey No. S00-11-0809. As a document of record, the 
Defendant had both actual and constructive notice of the 
recorded survey and its definition of how the elevation of 
Lot No. 2 9 was intended to be measured. 
8. Undisputed. 
9. Disputed. While it is true that Mr. Panos did not 
discuss the transaction directly with Mr. Olsen prior to 
closing, Mr. Panos did testify that he had conversations 
with Mr. Olsen after the closing about the height 
restriction. See Defendant's Statement of Fact No. 6 and 
Plaintiff's Statement of Fact Nos. 5 and 9. [R: 446, 564, 
587-601.] 
10. Undisputed that construction was begun on the 
house on the property after closing. Undisputed that in 
October 2001 the Defendant adjusted the trusses on the home 
to lower the roof based on a conversation with Mr. Panos. 
[R. 446] . However, measurements were allegedly first taken 
by David Jenkins April 11, 2002. The date of the survey 
produced by Ensign Engineering in this case is January 21, 
2003. 
C. Response to Defendants Summary of the Testimony of Jay 
Olsen, 
1. Undisputed. 
2. Undisputed. 
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3. Undisputed that bullet point no. 7 in Addendum No. 
1 refers to the 32-foot height restriction. However, 
Plaintiff disputes the conclusion which the Defendant 
attempts to infer from the Addendum without any supporting 
testimony from Mr. 01sen or any other party. 
4. Undisputed. The xxaerial survey" referred to by 
the Defendant was nothing more than an outline of the 
boundaries for Lot Nos. 24 and 29 taken from the plat map 
for Eastridge No. 2 Subdivision. 
5. Undisputed. In addition, there were other 
documents referenced on the fax cover sheet and included in 
the fax. Mr. Olsen did not deny in his deposition that he 
received all the documents referenced in the fax cover 
sheet. As the Affidavit of Ron Thrapp confirms, all of the 
documents referenced on the fax cover sheet were sent 
concurrently, including but not limited to the relevant 
portion of the recorded survey. 
6. Disputed. While Mr. Olsen denied having the extent 
and/or details of his conversations with Mr. Thrapp about 
the height restriction or its measurement, Mr. Olsen 
acknowledged that he did deal with Mr. Thrapp as the agent 
for Mr. Panos. Mr. Thrapp7s testimony clearly establishes 
the existence and content of those conversations that Mr. 
Olsen alleges he does not remember. [R. 535-542] . 
7. Undisputed that Mr. Olsen did not deny receiving a 
copy of the survey at closing. 
8. Undisputed. 
P. Response to Defendant7s Summary of the Affidavit of 
David Jenkins. 
1. Undisputed. 
2. Undisputed that Mr. Jenkins took measurements on 
the property in question relating to the elevation of the 
house. But see response to Defendant's Fact No. 10, above. 
3. Undisputed that Mr. Jenkins stated that the peak 
of the roof was 31.96 feet above the point on the curb from 
which he took his base measurement. Disputed that Mr. 
Jenkins found the house to be in compliance with the height 
restriction, or that he would be qualified to state that 
conclusion. Mr. Jenkins made no reference to the objects 
protruding above the peak of the roof. Mr. Jenkins is also 
10 
not qualified to determine the point from which measurement 
should have been taken. Based on the fact that David Jenkins 
was not hired until April 11, 2002, roughly 6 months after 
Defendant first lowered the roof based on his conversation 
with Plaintiff, it appears that Defendant chose their base 
measurement point on the curb, because anything in the 
street would have supported the conclusion that the roof 
violated the height restriction. 
E. Response to Defendants Summary of the Deposition of 
Patrick Panos. 
1. Undisputed. 
2. Undisputed. 
3 . Undisputed. 
4. Undisputed. 
F. Response to Defendant1s Summary of the Affidavit of Ron 
Thrapp. 
1. Undisputed. 
2. Undisputed. 
3. Undisputed. 
4. Undisputed. 
5. Undisputed. 
6. Undisputed. 
7. Undisputed. 
ARGUMENT 
I. DEFENDANT'S ARGUMENT REQUIRES DEFENDANT TO IGNORE 
VARIOUS IMPORTANT FACTS, 
Defendant's brief attempts to apply the merger doctrine 
and other case law in a vacuum. Rather than discussing all 
of the relevant facts applicable in the present case, 
Defendant's brief makes several arguments based on 
implications which are contradicted by the evidence in the 
case. 
1. The street to the West of the property has a slope 
of at least 3.05 feet. As discussed under Argument II, 
below, the deed cannot be interpreted without referring to 
the actual property described in the deed.2 Defendant's 
All legal descriptions depend upon monuments, surveys or plat maps which may or may not be expressly 
referenced. Likewise restrictive covenants and easements remain enforceable despite seldom being expressly referred 
to in deeds. In this case, the survey is a recorded document, although not expressly referenced, it would not be out of 
step with ordinary real estate practice for the Court to examine the document if needed to ascertain the intended 
application of the actual language of the deed or the restrictions affecting the property. In this case, reference to the 
survey is appropriate. Since the deed itself does fail to unambiguously identify the point from which the Grantor 
intended that the height restriction be measured, the recorded survey provides the answer and is appropriately 
brought to the attention of the Court for its intended purpose. This is exactly what the Court did in Hartman v. Potter, 
596 P.2d 653, 657 (Utah 1979) when it first identified what it was that the grantor owned (by reference to a prior 
deed of record) before determining what the grantor reserved with the language "reserved unto Grantors three-
fourths (3/4) of all oil gas, and mineral rights to the above land belonging." Without the context of the prior deed, 
one would assume a conveyance of V4 of all mineral rights to the property from the face of the instrument was an 
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argument fails to properly deal with the question about how 
the slope affects the interpretation of the legal 
instrument. As mentioned under item no. 6, below, of this 
Argument I, Defendant has simply argued that words or 
meaning should be added to the deed to support its 
interpretation. Defendant cites no supporting case law, and 
Defendant makes no logical argument to support its decision 
to ignore that the street adjacent to the property in 
question has a slope of more than three feet from one end to 
the other. 
2. The Warranty Deed does contain a height 
restriction. Defendant's arguments concerning the merger 
doctrine would only make sense if the Warranty Deed failed 
to contain a height restriction. If no height restriction 
were mentioned at all, the merger doctrine might be 
construed to prohibit the Plaintiff from arguing that a 
unambiguous reference. However, the Supreme Court held that because the grantor held only a Vi interest in the first 
place, the conveyance intended by the grantor was only as to a 1/8 interest of all mineral rights in the property. 
Moreover, the Supreme Court held that the parties were charged with notice thereof by virtue of the recording of an 
earlier conveyance of 14 of said mineral rights (citing Utah Code Ann., Section 57-1-6 (1953). Unlike "closing 
instructions", both unreferenced in a deed and unrecorded, the survey is both recorded and related to the subject of a 
height restriction expressly stated in the deed, making defendant's reference to Mavnard v. Whorton, 912 P.2d 446 
(Utah App. 1996) inapplicable. 
height restriction was intended.3 However, in the present 
case, the parties agree that the deed contains a height 
restriction. The merger doctrine does not, therefore, 
preclude enforcement of the height restriction. Instead, 
because the parties did include a height restriction in the 
Warranty Deed, the Court is faced with the interpretation of 
the parties7 intent. 
3. The survey that defines the height restriction was 
recorded before the property was listed for sale. When a 
person purchases a property, the purchase is subject to 
instruments of record. One would not conclude that if a Quit 
Claim Deed failed to mention easements or restrictive 
covenants affecting the property, that the Grantee would no 
longer be subject to those existing easements and 
restrictions. Likewise, the Defendant is not entitled to 
assume that his ownership of the property in question is not 
subject to a survey of record. 
In stating the issues for review, Defendant cites Mavnard v. Whorton, 912 P.2d 446, 449-50 (Utah App. 1996) 
for the proposition that the merger doctrine extinguishes the right of a buyer under an antecedent agreement. 
Mavnard does not state that the Court cannot look to prior recorded instrument to aid in interpretation of the intent 
that is expressed in a deed, which is the question in the present case. See footnote 2. 
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4. The survey has no purpose other than to define the 
measurement of a height restriction. Since the sole function 
of the survey is to define a height restriction, it stands 
to reason that the instrument of record defines the intent 
of the Grantor and that the instrument of record contains 
the basis for measurement of any height restriction 
contained in a subsequently recorded instrument, including 
the deed from the Plaintiff to the Defendant in the present 
case. Defendant cites Hartman v. Potter, 596 P. 2d 653, 656 
(Utah 1979) for the proposition that the xx intent of the 
grantor" upon which interpretation of a deed is to be 
based, is a NXterm of art." The legal meaning of xv Intent" 
requires the application of principles of contract 
interpretation and requires reference to instruments of 
record at the time of the conveyance, particularly where an 
ambiguity would otherwise result. 
5. The Defendant did not contest the testimony of Mr. 
Panos or Mr. Thrapp that all of the parties had a meeting of 
the minds that the height restriction was intended to be 
measured from the base measurement point provided by the 
recorded survey.4 Therefore, it also stands to reason that 
the recorded survey also expresses the intent and 
understanding of the Grantee. The Court in the present case 
must consider the intent of the parties both as a matter of 
law and as a matter of equity. 
6. The height restriction stated in the Warranty Deed 
does not state that the restriction should be measured from 
the highest point of the street or that the measurement 
should be taken from anywhere in the street, at the 
discretion of the Defendant. Defendant is not entitled to 
change the wording of the instrument in question in order to 
eliminate the existing ambiguity. However, this is exactly 
what Defendant attempts to do where it states, xxThe 
Warranty Deed does not contain the narrow measurement 
requirement now advocated by Panos," and then states 
without logic or citation to case law that, therefore, xxThe 
restriction requires that the measuring point be taken from 
Since the foundation and details of the relevant conversations are established by Mr. Thrapp's testimony, the 
Defendant's suggestion that Mr. Thrapp lacks personal knowledge of Mr. Olsen's state of mind is inaccurate. 
Likewise, Mr. Panos testified that he confirmed the understanding of Mr. Olsen in conversations subsequent to the 
closing. The testimony establishes that both parties considered the recorded survey to be a contemporaneous 
document which established the basis for the measurement. 
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anywhere from the 'existing street lying West and adjacent 
to said land'. " As Defendant acknowledges, the insertion of 
the xxanywhere" reference broadens the meaning of the 
provision beyond the actual meaning of the words. It leads 
to a multitude of possible unintended results. 
7. Defendant is the drafter of the REPC. As the 
Defendant argues in its brief, documents are frequently 
construed against the drafter. Defendant uses the provisions 
of the REPC to buttress its position.5 Therefore, the 
language of the REPC must be applied against the Defendant 
as the drafter of the instrument. 
8. The title company drafted the restriction in the 
Warranty Deed based on the ambiguity created by the 
Defendant in the REPC. The title company was acting as the 
fiduciary of both parties. The Defendant is not, therefore, 
entitled to argue that the Warranty Deed should be construed 
against the Plaintiff, because the Plaintiff was not the 
5
 If Defendant is correct that reference to the REPC is appropriate, then the survey which was faxed to Defendant 
for the purpose of defining the measurement of the height restriction was clearly a contemporaneous document that 
must be referred to in interpreting the REPC, even if the language is not construed against the drafter of the REPC. 
See Winegar v. Froerer Corp. 813 P.2d 104 (Utah 1991). The survey was among the documents, exchanged 
contemporaneously with execution of the REPC. 
drafter thereof. Instead, as the drafter of the REPC 
provision upon which the title company based its drafting of 
the height restriction, the Defendant is the originator of 
the ambiguity created by the title company. Where a third 
party creates an ambiguity or an error in expressing the 
intent of the parties, the Court must examine the intent of 
the parties and reform an applicable instrument, if 
necessary, in order to reflect the true intent of the 
parties.6 
9. Defendant's own survey measures the height of the 
property from the curb, rather than from the street. The 
Trial Court was not entitled to enter summary judgment 
6
 The reformation argument was presented to the Trial Court. Defendant's suggestion that it was not adequately 
briefed or pleaded is without merit. It was raised in Plaintiffs original cross-motion for summary judgment and 
response to the Defendant's motion for summary judgment and again in the subsequent Rule 60(b) motion. [R. 410-
411, 570-572, 661-662.] Until the defendant's cross motion for summary judgment, defendant refused to provide a 
copy of its survey [See R. 517] and Plaintiff had no reason to know that defendant was proposing to use a base 
measurement point other than the one provided by the recorded survey, as discussed and acknowledged by both 
parties. Had the Trial Court stated it would consider the reformation argument only if a motion to amend were filed, 
Plaintiff would have made such a motion. However, as a matter of law, a party is not required to make a futile 
motion, and the Trial Court had the discretion to treat the Plaintiffs memorandum as a motion to amend. In this case, 
the Trial Court rejected Plaintiffs reformation argument and attempting to amend would have been futile. 
Interestingly, it is the Defendant who is raising for the first time on appeal a defense that reformation was not 
expressly pleaded. Defendant raised no such argument at trial, and the Trial Court did not raise the matter, either. 
The particularity requirements of pleading are not jurisdictional. Therefore, the arguments made in Plaintiffs 
pleadings are adequate. As Defendant points out, the Trial Court expressed an inability to understand the 
significance of the survey. The Trial Court has inherent authority to correct its own ruling. See Kunzler v. O'dell. 
855 P.2d 220 (Utah App. 1993), Rees v. Albertson's. Inc.. 587 P.2d 130 (Utah 1978) [R. 656-659]. The opportunity 
was offered to the Court in the Rule 60(b) motion. Finally, reformation is only relevant as a means of granting 
Plaintiff the relief requested by the Complaint if the ambiguity in question is resolved against the Plaintiff. 
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against the Plaintiff on the basis of the facts, regardless 
of the Court's ruling as to whether or not the language of 
the deed was ambiguous. 
10. Defendant's own survey fails to take into account 
the portions of the structure that protrude above the peak 
of the roof. The Trial Court was not entitled to enter 
summary judgment against the Plaintiff on the basis of the 
facts, regardless of the Court's ruling as to whether or not 
the language of the deed was ambiguous. 
Based on the disputed evidence, summary judgment could 
not have been entered against the Plaintiff as a matter of 
law. Moreover, based on the undisputed evidence, summary 
judgment should have been granted against the Defendant. The 
degree of the violation of the height restriction was either 
one-and-a-half feet or four-and-a-half feet, which could 
only be finally adjudicated upon setting the correct base 
measurement point for the restriction. Regardless of the 
base measurement point, the construction violates the height 
restriction in the deed. 
II. EXTRINSIC EVIDENCE AIDS 
INTERPRETATION OF THE DEED PROVISION. 
The street in front of my house is level. If someone 
were to measure a height restriction from any point on the 
street to the West of my home, the result would be the same. 
The language of the height restriction used in the Warranty 
Deed in the present case would not be ambiguous if it were 
contained in an instrument referring to my property. 
Therefore, the language does not contain a patent ambiguity. 
It is not ambiguous on its face. One can assume that the 
individual at the title company that drafted the height 
restriction also lived on a level street and did not 
consider it necessary to refer to a survey to describe the 
height restriction. 
At the hearing held December 12, 2003, the Plaintiff 
explained that the deed restriction contained a XNlatent 
ambiguity." In the case of In Re Estate of Pouser, 975 P.2d 
704 (Ariz. 1999), the Court explained that a latent 
ambiguity is not readily apparent upon examination of a 
document, but became apparent when extrinsic evidence is 
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introduced, because the facts show that two possible 
interpretations exist on the basis of the language used. Id. 
at 768. In such a case, extrinsic evidence is necessary to 
determine intent. Icl. at 709. 
The Utah Courts address ambiguity in the same manner. 
"Language is considered ambiguous if the words used to 
express the meaning and intention of the parties are 
insufficient in a sense that the contract may be understood 
to reach two or more plausible meanings." Crother v. 
Carter, 767 P.2d 129, 131 (Utah App. 1989). 
Now suppose we wanted to take a height restriction 
measurement at the Defendant's property. If we sent ten 
people out at the same time to measure whether the 
Defendant's home violates the 32-foot height restriction, we 
might receive ten different conclusions. Every person we 
send out might go to a different point along the street to 
take the measurement. Depending upon the elevation upon 
which they began, they would each return with a different 
result. Technically, none of the conclusions would be wrong. 
(As Defendant argues, xxHence any point from the street 
satisfies this requirement. " ) The language expressing the 
height restriction does not identify the point from which 
the measurement is to be taken, other than to say that the 
measurement should be taken from somewhere in the street to 
the West of the property. Nevertheless, the Grantor and the 
Grantee may have had a meeting of the minds as to a specific 
intent. That intent is not irrelevant, as the Defendant 
suggests. It is the role of the Court and the goal of 
applicable precedent to justly determine that intent. To 
determine whether there was a specific intent, one may need 
to go outside of the deed itself and look for evidence of 
that intent. 
Ambiguity is only one legal basis upon which the Courts 
may look outside of a specific instrument to determine the 
intent of the parties thereto. The Courts also typically 
look at contemporaneous documents, contemporaneous 
circumstances, and other instruments of record. 
The deed states that the height restriction shall be 
x
'measured from the existing street lying West and adjacent 
to said land." Immediately West of the property is the 
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brass cap monument referred to in the survey and agreed upon 
by the parties. It presents one interpretation of the 
language in the deed. The deed does not state that the 
measurement should be taken from the x"Northwest corner of 
the property'' or from the xxhighest point" of the street. 
The absence of such a reference leaves open a possible 
conflicting interpretation which would change the 
measurement by as much as three feet. The survey of record 
is the only instrument that resolves the question of the 
parties7 intent, and there is no testimony or other evidence 
that contradicts it. Only argument by Defendant's counsel 
stands in the way of appropriate reference to the evidence. 
Construed in the light most favorable to the Plaintiff, 
the trier of fact could clearly conclude that the specific 
point from which the height restriction was to be measured 
is the base measurement point of 100.00 defined by the 
survey of record. Consequently, summary judgment against the 
Plaintiff was reversible error. 
III. THE AMBIGUITY IN THE REPC AND THE DEED SHOULD BE 
CONSTRUED AGAINST THE DEFENDANT AS THE DRAFTER. 
As the drafter of the ambiguity, the references to the 
height restriction should be construed against the 
Defendant. See Fact No. 7 and Argument I, above. 
On the other hand, it is also the law that before an 
uncertainty or ambiguity can be construed against the 
drafter, the Court 
xxwill have recourse to every aid, rule, or canon of 
construction to ascertain the intention of the 
parties... Under such circumstances it should be the 
aim of Courts, as, no doubt, it is their duty, to 
ascertain and declare the intent of the parties, since 
that, and nothing else, constitutes their contract; and 
it is the duty of the Courts to enforce, not to make, 
contract." 
Freeman v. Gee, 18 Utah 2d 339, 425 P.2d 155, 159 (Utah 
1967),7 citing Reese Howell Co. v. Brown, 48 Utah 142, 158 
P. 684. Plaintiff has provided the relevant rules of 
construction in the Brief of Appellant and in the foregoing 
argument. 
7
 Defendant cites Freeman v. Gee, supra, and Parrish v. Richards, 336 P.2d 122 (Utah 1959) for the proposition that 
restrictions are to be construed by resolving doubts in favor of unrestricted use of the property. However, both cases 
contained the above citation to the importance of ascertaining the parties' intent and Freeman v. Gee, supra, even 
reversed a restrictive interpretation by the Trial Court. 
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Construed in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, the 
deed should be reformed to conform to the meaning agreed 
upon and intended by the parties. Therefore, summary 
judgment against the Plaintiff was improper. 
CONCLUSION 
Plaintiff respectfully requests that the Court of 
Appeals issue an order setting aside the summary judgment 
granted in favor of Defendant and directing the Trial Court 
to enter summary judgment in favor of the Plaintiff. 
Alternatively, the matter should be returned to the Trial 
Court to be tried. 
DATED this _P_ daY o f JulY> 2005. 
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